Informal Governance in Venezuela: Emigration
‘The Bolivarian diaspora has been caused by the “deterioration of both the economy and the social fabric, rampant crime, uncertainty and lack of hope for a change of leadership in the near future”’ (Olivares, 2014)
Overview
Venezuela was once one of “Latin America’s economic powerhouses and a regional diplomatic heavyweight” (The Editorial Board, 2017, p. A30). In recent years, it has descended into its deepest crisis in modern history as the combined result of two decades of economic mismanagement, falling oil prices, deterioration of democratic institutions, and insecurity (Páez, 2017). As such its migratory profile has changed to that of a country of origin, resulting in a migratory phenomenon that is referred to as the Bolivarian Diaspora.
The crisis has accelerated dramatically since 2015, with new figures from IOM indicating that the number of Venezuelans abroad has risen from under 700 000 in 2015 to 3 million in November 2018.This democratic deterioration has meant that a number of informal and corrupt practices have become more prominent, such as bribery, social capitaland abuse of power. With food used as a political weapon, millions have been left struggling to meet basic needs.
https://www.nytimes.com/video/players/offsite/index.html?videoId=100000005908945There are three major areas of this crisis that demonstrate Venezuela’s shift towards informal governance: crime, the economy, and political repression. The key theme all of these elements is the pervasive corruption which has taken root and is obstructing the protection of human rights.
Increasing violence and crime
“I would rather say goodbye to my son in the airport than in the cemetery”’ (Casey, 2016)
It is hardly surprising that one of the main reasons for emigration from Venezuela is citizen insecurity due to violence and crime, when according to the OVV it is the second most violent nation in the world outside of open warand the Venezuelan government has admitted to deliberately refraining from releasing crime statistics to the public.
Citizen insecurity is compounded when one considers Amnesty international’s report of the homicide rate in Venezuela, which identifies the main victims as young men from poor areas. When 4,667 (22%) of the homicides in 2016 were at the hands of security officials (Amnesty International, 2018, p. 7), it shows that “emigrants are fleeing … from the absence of physical protection by the state – and, indeed, the violence perpetrated by it too” (Mijares & Rojas Silva, 2018).
Thus, these subversive informal practices enacted by state officials are a leading cause of emigration from Venezuela and are therefore fundamental to the humanitarian crisis as a whole.
Economic and social crisis
“Poor governance, a concerted effort to quash the voice of the people coupled with rampant corruption are leading Venezuela to a terrible destiny.” – Mercedes De Freitas
As Venezuela goes into its sixth year of recession, the root cause of the humanitarian crisis is clear: it is the result of the failed 19-year Chavismo experiment in “twenty-first century socialism.”As a result of this crisis, informal practices are somewhat commonplace. Informal practices including to those mentioned above are specifically defined in this post as “activity outside the normative regulatory system of the state” (Cross, 1998, p. 41).
The consequences of these informal practices are multifaceted; as Venezuela’s informal economy has become more prominent, hyperinflation has increased, and formal job prospects have grown scarcer. The middle class has virtually disappeared, as most of those emigrating are within higher socioeconomic groups. One study showed that about “90 percent have a university degree, and of these 40 percent have at least one master’s degree and nearly 10 hold doctorates” (Páez, 2017). Amongst those who have remained, a new breed of criminal has emerged,“where before criminals were robbing in order to live a life of luxury, now they’re stealing food” (Nugent, 2018). Even citizens who have emigrated have been forced to turned to ‘jobs’ where their working conditions are exploitative or even dangerous.
These informal practices are merely one aspect of Maduro’s despotic and violent tactics, and have forced many to uproot their lives to escape the trauma of repression and poverty.
Political repression
There is little-to-no political freedom in Venezuela, and opposition leaders have joined the Bolivarian exodus by fleeing the country since councilman Fernando Albán’s supposed suicide, which is suspected to have beenan act of torture and murder by state officials.
In addition to this, it is widely recognised that speaking out against the current regime is dangerous: since Mr. Maduro took power in 2013, the government has arrested 6,893 people and jailed 433 for political reasons. Furthermore, according to NGO Foro Penal, since April 2017 there have been around 135 deaths, mainly in the context of demonstrations and protests against the government. As a result of this, there has been worldwide condemnation of what has been coined Maduro’s “assault on democracy” (Borak & Gillespie, 2017), including sanctions imposed by the EUand the US.
This is a direct result of the impact of informal practices as the government agents are acting outside of what is considered to be normative state behaviour, and this is reflected by the report giving Venezuela’s aggregate freedom score nineteen out of one hundred (with one hundred being most free and zero being least free); within that report, its political rights score is a mere three out of forty (Freedom House, 2019).
Conclusion
When the state utilises “lethal force against the most vulnerable and socially excluded sectors of the population” (Amnesty International, 2018, p. 5), emigration is hardly a surprising choice for victims. Though it is clear that the Bolivarian diaspora is a specific consequence of the general humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, it remains the most pressing consideration when looking to the future and the eventual resolution of the strife facing the nation.
Works Cited
Amnesty International, 2018. Venezuela: This Is No Way To Live, London: Amnesty International.
Borak, D. & Gillespie, P., 2017. U.S. slaps sanctions on Venezuelan president Maduro. CNN Business, 31 July.
Casey, N., 2016. Hungry Venezuelans Flee in Boats to Escape Economic Collapse. The New York Times, 25 November.
Cross, J. C., 1998. Co-optation, Competition, and Resistance State and Street Vendors in Mexico City. LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, 25(99), pp. 41-61.
Freedom House, 2019. Freedom in the World 2019 Report on Venezuela, Washinton: Freedom House.
Mijares, V. M. & Rojas Silva, N., 2018. Venezuelan Migration Crisis puts the Region’s Democratic Governability at Risk. GIGA Focus Lateinamerika, October, Volume 6, pp. 1-13.
Nugent, C., 2018. How Hunger Fuels Crime and Violence in Venezuela. Time Magazine, 23 October.
Olivares, F., 2014. Best and brightest for export, Caracas: El Universal.
Páez, T., 2017. Amid Economic Crisis and Political Turmoil, Venezuelans Form a New Exodus. Migration Information Source, 14 June.
The Editorial Board, 2017. Crisis Upon Crisis in Venezuela. The New York Times, 29 March.
Informal Governance in Crisis Venezuela 